We consider the Maximum Vectors problem in a strategic setting. In the classical setting this problem consists, given a set of k-dimensional vectors, in computing the set of all nondominated vectors.
Introduction
A great variety of algorithms and methods have been designed for various optimization problems. In classic Combinatorial Optimization, the algorithm knows the complete input of the problem, and its goal is to produce an optimal or near optimal solution. However, in many modern applications the input of the problem is spread among a set of selfish agents, where eachone owns a different part of the input as private knowledge. Hence, every agent is capable to manipulate the algorithm by miss-reporting its part of the input in order to maximize its personal payoff. In their seminal paper Nisan and Ronen [25] were the first to study the impact of the "strategic" behavior of the agents on the difficulty of an optimization problem. Since then Algorithmic Mechanism Design studies optimization problems in presence of selfish agents with private knowledge of the input and potentially conflicting individual objective functions. The goal is to know whether it is possible to propose a truthful (or incentive compatible) mechanism, i.e., an algorithm solving the optimization problem together with a set of incentives/payments for the agents motivating them to report honestly their part of the input.
As an illustrating example, consider the problem of finding the maximum of a set of values v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n . In the classic setting, computing the maximum value is trivial. Let us consider now the case when the inputs are strategic. It means that each of the n selfish agents i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, has a private value v i (not known to the algorithm) for being selected (as the * Contact Author maximum), and may report any value b i . If the agents know that the maximum value will be computed using the classic algorithm: max i b i , then each agent will have an incentive to cheat by declaring +∞ instead of her true value.
In such a strategic setting, we need a mechanism that is capable to give incentive to the agents to report eachone their true value. For doing that we may use Vickrey's (also known as second-price) mechanism [32] . In this setting, the maximum max i b i is still computed, but the agent i * =arg max b i is charged the second highest reported value p * := max j =i * b j . Her utility is therefore v i * − p * . It can be shown that in such a setting each agent i will have an incentive to report b i = v i , and henceforth this mechanism is able to compute the maximum value in this strategic environment [12] .
In this paper, we consider the problem of maximum vectors, i.e., the problem of finding the maxima of a set of vectors in a strategic environment. The classic problem of computing the maxima of a set of vectors can be stated as follows: we are given a set
with at least one strict inequality among the k inequalities. The problem consists in computing M AX(V ), i.e. the set of all nondominated vectors among the n given vectors. This problem is related to other known problems as the Pareto curve computation in multiobjective optimization [16; 27; 31] , the skyline problem in databases [20; 26] , or the contour problem [23] . In a "strategic" setting the problem is as follows: there are n selfish agents 1, 2, . . . , n and the value of agent i is described by a vector
The vector v i is a private information known only by agent i. Computing the set of nondominated vectors by using one of the classic algorithms gives incentive to the agents to cheat by declaring +∞ in all the coordinates of their vectors instead of their true values per coordinate. Our work explores under which conditions it is possible to incentivize agents to report their true values. In order to precisely answer this question, it is useful to distinguish two cases. In the strongest case, the mechanism is able to enforce truthtelling for each agent regardless of the reports of the others (truthfulness). In the second case, the mechanism is able to enforce truthtelling for each agent assuming that the others report their true values (equilibria truthfulness).
Previous works The Artificial Intelligence (AI) community is faced with many real-world problems involving multiple, conflicting and noncommensurate objectives in path planning [15; 21; 29] , game search [11] , preference-based configuration [3] , ... Modeling such problems using a single scalar-valued criterion may be problematic (see for instance [33] ) and hence multiobjective approaches have been studied in the AI literature [18; 22] . Some multiobjective problems have been considered in the mechanism design framework. However, these works apply a budget approach where instead of computing the set of all Pareto solutions (or an approximation of this set), they consider that among the different criteria, one is the main criterion to be optimized while the others are modeled via budget constraints [7; 17] .
Another family of related works concern auction theory. In the classical setting, the item as well as the valuation of the bidders are characterized by a scalar representing the price/value of the item. However, in many situations an item is characterized, besides of its price, by quality measures, delivery times, technical specifications etc. In such cases, the valuation of the bidders for the item are vectors. Auctions where the item to sell or buy are characterized by a vector are known as multi-attribute auctions [1; 2; 4; 5; 6; 8; 9; 13; 14] . In most of these works, a scoring rule is used for combining the values of the different attributes in order to determine the winner of the auction.
Our contribution We first show that neither truthfulness nor equilibria truthfulness are achievable. However, if one assumes that the agents have distinct values in each of the dimensions, we show that it is possible to design an equilibria truthful mechanism for the Maximum Vector problem. We also show that the payments that our algorithm computes are the only payments that give this guarantee. In order to go beyond the negative result concerning ties in the valuations of agents, we show that it is possible to get an equilibria truthful mechanism for the Weakly Maximum Vector problem in which one looks for weakly nondominated vectors instead of nondominated ones [16] .
Problem definition
The following definition and notations will be useful in the sequel of the paper. Definition 1. Given two vectors x, y ∈ R k + we say that: • x weakly dominates y, denoted by x y, iff x j ≥ y j for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k}; • x dominates y, denoted by x ≻ y, iff x y and x j > y j holds for at least one coordinate j ∈ {1, . . . , k}; • x strongly dominates y, denoted by x ≫ y, iff x j > y j holds for all coordinates j ∈ {1, . . . , k}; • x and y are incomparable, denoted by x ∼ y, iff there exist two coordinates, say j and j ′ , such that
We denote by R k + (resp. R k * + ) the set of vectors v ∈ R k such that v ≻ 0 (resp. v ≫ 0), with 0 := (0, . . . , 0) the zero vector. Given a set F ⊂ R k + , as stated before, we denote by M AX(F ) the subset of all nondominated vectors, i.e. M AX(F ) := {v ∈ F : ∃v * ∈ F, v * ≻ v}. Such a set is composed of pairwise incomparable vectors. In a similar way, we will denote by M IN (F ) the set {v ∈ F : ∃v * ∈ F, v ≻ v * }. We will also consider the subset of all weakly nondominated vectors, i.e. W M AX(F ) := {v ∈ F : ∃v * ∈ F, v * ≫ v}.
The Maximum Vector problem has been studied in the classical framework, and the following proposition is known:
Following the mechanism design framework [24] , we aim to design a mechanism, that we call Pareto mechanism, such that no agent has an incentive to misreport its vector in order to increase her utility. The set of agents is denoted by N . Each agent i has a private vector
representing the agent valuations on k numerical criteria for being selected. In the following, we consider that k is a fixed constant. We denote by V the set of private vectors. Each agent i reports a vector (a bid)
. We denote by B the set of all reported vectors. Based on the set of reported vectors, the mechanism computes for each agent i a vector-payment
she has to pay p i and so her utility is
her utility is u i = 0 (zero vector). Since no agent has an incentive to misreport her vector in order to increase her utility, we will be able to correctly compute M AX(V ) by computing M AX(B) since we will have M AX(B) = M AX(V ).
If we consider W M AX instead of M AX we use the term of a weakly Pareto mechanism.
Preliminaries
The Pareto mechanism we want to design must satisfy several properties.
Definition 2 (multiobjective individual rationality). A Pareto mechanism satisfies the multiobjective individual rationality (MIR) constraint iff u i 0 for all agents i.
By the MIR constraint, it is always better for an agent to participate in the mechanism (i.e. reports a vector) than not participating. In the following we will always assume that the mechanism satisfies the MIR constraint.
We want that the Pareto mechanism incentivize agents to report their true values. This leads to the two following formal definitions. 
Definition 3 (multiobjective truthfulness). For any fixed set of reported vectors
Honestly reporting her valuation is a dominant strategy for any agent if the mechanism is truthful.
We will also need some additional definitions in the context of multicriteria optimization, along with some technical lemmas. The missing proofs can be found in the Appendix Section. In the sequel, all sets S have a finite size. Figure 1 : The reference points in dimension 2. One has S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} and T (S) = {t1, t2, t3, t4, t5}.
T (S), as the minimum subset of
Such a set can be easily computed in dimension 2. For k = 2, an example is depicted in Figure 1 . Let S ⊂ R 2 * + . By Proposition 1, we compute M AX(S) = {s 1 , . . . , s r }, where the solutions s i , 1 ≤ i ≤ r, are pairwise incomparable. Without loss of generality we assume that s 
The existence and uniqueness of such a set for any dimension follows from Proposition 2. Let D j S := {0} ∪ {s j : s ∈ S} for j = 1, . . . , k, and
Notice that |Ω S | ≤ (|S| + 1) k and by using Proposition 1 we obtain that for any S ⊂ R k * + its set of reference points T (S) can be computed in polynomial time with respect to |S| (k is assumed to be a constant). For example, with k = 3 and S = {(2, 2, 2), (1, 3, 3) , (3, 1, 1)}, using Proposition 2 one obtains:
Impossibility results
Because of the following Proposition, achieving an equilibria truthful Pareto mechanism is the best we can hope for. Figure 2 . We claim that we can not have p 3 ∈ R. Indeed if it was the case, then if v 3 = (2, 2) agent 3's interest would be to lie and report b 3 = ((1+p Proof. The proof is very similar to the one for Proposition 3. We only need to assume that agents 1 and 2 are reporting their true vectors, i.e. b 1 = v 1 = (3, 1) and b 2 = v 2 = (1, 3) , and notice that the DV assumption does not hold in cases 1 and 2.
A Pareto mechanism for the Maximum Vector problem
We are going to present a Pareto mechanism, denoted by M, which satisfies the MIR constraint and which is equilibriatruthful under the hypothesis DV. The mechanism is described in Algorithm 1. In the initial step, we remove all identical vectors. This means that if there is a set of agents with the same reported vector b, this vector is removed from the set B and all such agents will not be considered anymore in the mechanism. Notice that this case will not occur, since we are in the context of a equilibria truthfulm mechanism and we have the DV assumption. Not having two identical vectors is a formal requirement used in the proof of Lemma 1. The mechanism computes for all agents i such that b i ∈ M AX(B) a set of possible payments, denoted by P AY (i), and can charge agent i any payment from this set. In what follows, we use the following standard notation in game theory. Given a set of reported vectors B := {b j | j ∈ N }, we denote by (b −i , v i ) the set in which each agent j ∈ N \ {i} reports b j , excepted the agent i which reports v i instead, and we denote by (b −i , b i ) the set in which each agent j ∈ N reports b j including the agent i which reports b i .
Before proving Theorem 2 we need the following two lemmas: Lemma 2. Let S ⊂ R k * + be a finite set. Then, ∀t ∈ T (S) and ∀j ∈ {1, . . . k}, then t j = 0 or ∃s ∈ S such that t j = s j . Figure 3a . Therefore, the utility u
Lemma 3. Let S ⊂ R k * + be a finite set. Then, T (S) is composed of mutually noncomparable vectors, i.e. ∀t, t ′ ∈ T (S), one has
According to the mechanism M, if agent i declares her true value, she will be charged some t such that t ∈ T (B \ {b i }). Her utility u i will be v i − t. If agent i reports b i such that b i ∈ M AX(b −i , b i ), then she will be charged t ′ for some t ′ ∈ T (B \ {b i }) and her utility u ′ i will be v i − t ′ . Since by Lemma 3 one has t = t ′ or t ∼ t ′ , the utilitie will satisfy u We are now going to prove that the Pareto mechanism we introduced is the unique way of achieving equilibria truthfulness.
Let π be a truthful payment function, i.e. given a set of reported vectors B, for any agent i, π i (B) is the amount charged to the agent i, such that no agent has an incentive to declare a false vector. Recall that by the MIR constraint, we assume that
(1)
Proof. Let us assume that
We need additional lemmas. Lemma 5. Let S ⊂ R k * + be a finite set. Then, ∀s ∈ M AX(S), ∃t ∈ T (S) such that s ≻ t.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that x z. Since y ∼ z, one can assume without loss of generality that y 1 > z 1 and y 2 < z 2 . Since y ≻ x, one has y 2 ≥ x 2 . Therefore, z 2 > x 2 , which is in contradiction with x z.
Proof. Let us consider any s ∈ S with s = s * . We know that s ∼ s * , and by using Lemma 6 with x = p, y = s * and z = s, we obtain that p s, i.e. s ≫ p or s ∼ p.
Proof. Let S = {s 1 , . . . , s |S| }. Since p ∼ s, ∀s ∈ S, it means that ∀s i ∈ S, ∃l i , l
and let ε j be any positive real number otherwise. Then it is easy to see that the vector δ = (ε 1 /2, . . . , ε k /2) satisfies the lemma. Indeed, observe that ε j > 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Now let us consider any s r ∈ S with 1 ≤ r ≤ |S|. One has s lr r > p lr and s Lemma 9. Let S ⊂ R k + a set of k-dimensional vectors, and let p ∈ R k + such that one has ∀s ∈ S 1 , s ∼ p, and one has ∀s ∈ S 2 , s ≻ p, with S 1 and S 2 a bipartition of S, i.e.
Proof. This result can be considered as a generalization of Lemma 8 and the proof is quite similar. For the set S 1 we define ǫ j as previously. For the set S 2 , we define ε ′j = min {s∈S2 : s j −p j >0} s j − p j if the set {s ∈ S 2 : s j − p j > 0} is not empty, otherwise ε ′j is any positive value. Then it is easy to see that the vector δ with δ j = min{ε j , ε ′j }/2, for 1 ≤ j ≤ k satisfies the lemma. For example, let us consider
If s ∈ S 1 the proof is the same than Lemma 8.
Lemma 10. Let z j and u j , for j ≥ 1, be two infinite sequences of points in R k + such that z j ≫ z j+1 , z j u j ≻ t, and lim j→∞ z j = t. Then ∃l, l ′ such that u l ≻ u l ′ .
Proof. First, we assume there exist a point u i such that
αi . Without loss of generality by considering an (infinite) subsequence of u i we can assume that ∀i, α i = 1. Again by considering an (infinite) subsequence we can assume that ∃K with 1 ≤ K ≤ k − 1 such that ∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ K, one has u j i = t j , and ∀j, K + 1 ≤ j ≤ k, one has u j i > t j . Now we can apply the same line of reasoning than in the first case, by considering only the coordinates between K +1 and k. Proof. The proof is by contradiction. We assume that the payment is computed in a different way than in our Pareto mechanism, and we show that there exists a configuration for which an agent has an incentive to lie. We consider any agent i, and any vector b i such that b i ∈ M AX(b −i , b i ). Let first assume that the payment computed π(b i ) is incomparable with the set of points T (B \ {b i }), i.e. ∀t ∈ T (B \ {b i }) one has π(b i ) ∼ t. Using Lemma 8, there exists We assume now that the payment computed π(b i ) is dominated by at least one point from T (B \ {b i }). Using Lemma 7 it means that there exists a bipartition
One cannot have v i ∈ M AX(B \{b i }), because Lemma 5 would contradict the fact that ∀t ∈ T 1 , t ≻ v i and ∀t ∈ T 2 , t ∼ v i . Therefore v i ∈ M AX(b −i , v i ) and the utility of agent i is 0 if i reports her true value v i . If agent i reports b i her utility will be u
that she has an incentive to lie. This case is illustrated in the Figure 4 (Case 2). We assume now that the payment computed π(b i ) strictly dominates at least one point t from T (B\{b i }). Now there are two cases to consider, either π(π( 
A Pareto mechanism for the Weakly Maximum Vector problem
We are going to present a Pareto mechanism, denoted by M ′ , which satisfies the MIR constraint and which is equilibriatruthful. For doing so, we modify the mechanism M in order to remove the DV condition. The modified mechanism is given in Table 2 and illustrated in Figure 5 . It can be shown that ∪ i∈W b i = W M AX(B).
Algorithm 2
The weakly Pareto mechanism M ′ .
1: Remove all identical vectors and corresponding agents. 2: For all i ∈ B, set P AY (i) := {t ∈ T (M AX(B) \ {b i }) | b i t}. 3: W is the set of agents i such that P AY (i) = ∅. 4: For all i ∈ W choose any p i ∈ P AY (i). 5: For all i / ∈ W , we set p i = 0. 
